Abstract-We present an obfuscation strategy to protect a program against injection attacks. The strategy represents the program as a set of code fragments in-between two consecutive system calls (the system blocks) and a graph that represents the execution order of the fragment (the system block graph). The system blocks and the system block graph are partitioned between two virtual machines (VMs). The Blocks-VM stores and executes the system blocks but does not store any information on how control flows across the system blocks. This information is represented only by the system block graph stored in the Graph-VM, which correctly sequentializes the system blocks by analyzing the system block graph and accessing the Blocks-VM. At run-time, each time a system block ends, i.e. the program issues a system call, the execution of the Blocks-VM is frozen and control is transferred to the Graph-VM. After deducing the next system block to be executed from the system block graph, the current system block and the current system call, the Graph-VM updates the return address in the Blocks-VM so that the correct system block is executed and then resumes the Blocks-VM. To protect code integrity, the Graph-VM also stores a hash of each block. The overall strategy results in a clean separation between the program and its control-flow and this is important whenever the Graph-VM is in full control of the user whereas the Blocks-VM may be attacked through code injection. The Graph-VM can discover these attacks because either the current system call is not present in the original program or the hash of the current block is invalid. In all these cases, the Graph-VM halts the execution of the program.
I. INTRODUCTION
Code obfuscation increases the complexity of reverse engineering of a program by transforming the appearance of its code to make it unintelligible, while preserving its original semantics. We show how a simple obfuscation strategy can protect a program in an untrustworthy environment from attacks that inject code into the program itself. The strategy represents a program as two disjoint pieces of information, namely a set of program fragments and the information to correctly sequentialize these fragments, Work partially supported by EU-funded project FP7-257438 CONTRAIL which are stored in two distinct virtual machines (VMs). The Blocks-VM stores a random permutation of the program fragments, whereas the Graph-VM stores the information to sequentialize these fragments. After executing the current fragment in the Blocks-VM, control is transferred to the Graph-VM that updates the status of the Blocks-VM to correctly execute the next fragment. We show that, if some code is injected into the Blocks-VM, the Graph-VM will detect some inconsistencies and stop the execution of the Blocks-VM. As an example, the Graph-VM may detect that the program is trying to invoke a system call that was not present in the original program. The proposed framework may produce distinct solutions according to the adopted definition of fragment: in particular, we consider that a fragment includes all the instructions in-between two system calls to simplify the transfer of control from the Blocks-VM to the Graph-VM. This definition of fragment results in the decomposition of a program into system blocks, where the notion of system block is similar to that of basic block, but system calls replace control transfers. By trapping the execution of a system call on the Blocks-VM, the Graph-VM is alerted that the execution of a fragment has terminated so that it can update the return address of the invocation of the Blocks-VM.
The paper is structured as follows. After discussing related works, in Sect. III we briefly describe the protection strategy. Section IV shows the run-time architecture of the proposed solution. Section V discusses the underlying threat model. Section VI presents some preliminary performance results. Finally, Sect. VII draws some conclusions and outlines future developments.
II. RELATED WORKS
The static and run-time tools to implement the proposed strategy extend those presented in [1] [2] . [3] describes a set of transformations that introduce aliases and further hinder the analysis by a systematic break-down of the program control-flow that transforms high-level control transfers into indirect addressing through aliased pointers. [4] studies the pros and cons of virtualization to create distinct copies of a piece of software and make them more resistant to reverse-engineering. [5] presents a framework for quantitative analysis of control-flow obfuscating trans-formations by expressing several existing control-flow obfuscation techniques as a sequence of basic transformations of the control-flow graph. [6] describes three control-flow obfuscation methods to protect Java class files, namely basic block fission, intersecting loop and replacing goto. [7] describes a control-flow obfuscation paradigm based on a two-process model where a permutation of static blocks removes control-flow information from the process and stores it in a concurrent process. The obfuscated program queries the monitor process for the correct address at each obfuscated juncture. [8] proposes a framework to obfuscate a binary code by transforming control transfers into signals and inserting dummy control transfers and junk instructions after the signals. [9] proposes information flow tracking to obfuscate a program control-flow with low performance degradation. [10] discusses address-space randomization, a technique used to protect systems against buffer overflow attacks by randomizing the memory location of some system components. The authors demonstrate a de-randomization attack to convert a standard injection-based exploit into an exploit that works against a system protected by addressspace randomization. [11] proposes control-flow integrity (CFI) to constrain the control-flow for security purposes. This security policy dictates that software execution must follow a path of a control-flow graph. CFI instrumentation embeds within the executable both the control-flow policy to be enforced at run-time and the enforcement mechanism.
III. SYSTEM BLOCKS AND SYSTEM BLOCK GRAPH
This section briefly introduces the program representation underlying the proposed obfuscation strategy.
The fundamental notion of our strategy is that of system block (SB), i.e. the program fragment that includes all the instructions that may be executed in-between two consecutive system calls. If s is a system call or the first instruction of the program, the SB following s is the smallest program fragment that includes all the instructions that may be executed in-between s (not included) and either the next system call (included) or the program end. A SB may be visualized as a sub-graph of the program control-flow graph that has just one entry point, the instruction following s, and several exit points, one for each system call that may be executed immediately after s, or for the program end if s is the last system call. While a SB recalls a basic block (BB), the two notions are fully orthogonal. As a matter of fact, a BB may include several SBs, because a sequence of instructions without jumps may also include several system calls. On the other hand, several consecutive BBs that do not contain a system call belong to the same SB. The notion of SB can be seen as a particular case of that of superblock [12] .
A program P may be decomposed into a set of SBs and a system block graph SBG(P ) that denotes the execution order among the SBs. SBG(P ) is an oriented graph where each node represents a distinct SB and each arc is coupled with a distinct system call among those that may be executed at the end of the SB represented by the source node of the arc. An arc denotes that the SB represented by the destination node (the destination SB) may be executed after the source SB, i.e. the SB represented by the source node. The system call coupled with the arc is the last instruction of the source SB. In general, several arcs may leave a node, because there may be several exit points for each SB, each corresponding to the execution of a distinct system call, if any. As an example, the following fragment: 1) the first SB begins at line 2 after the read() system call and has two exit points, in the write() (line 7) and in the time() (line 11) system calls. Hence, this SB includes the instructions x = x + 1;, z = -z;, time(); and x = x + 2;, write(); 2) the second SB begins at the instruction (line 8) after the write() system call, and ends in the system call time() (line 11). This SB contains the instructions: y = y * y;, z = -z;, time(); SBG(P ) is a transformation of CF G(P ), the controlgraph of P that shows the control-flow across BBs. To transform CF G(P ) into SBG(P ), we assume, without any loss of generality, that CF G(P ) includes exactly one initial BB and one final BB. First of all, the transformation locates all the sequences of instructions that end with a control transfer or a system call. Hence, to map CF G(P ) into SBG(P ), we introduce an intermediate representation based upon the notions of unit block (UB) and unit block graph (U BG(P )). An UB represents any sequence of instructions of a single BB in-between two consecutive delimiters, where a delimiter is either a system call or the first and the last instruction of the BB. If the first instruction of an UB is the first program instruction or it immediately follows a system call, then the UB is the initial UB of a SB, whereas UBs having as their last instruction either a system call or the last instruction of a program are the final UBs of the corresponding SB. As an example, the following fragment: 1) x = x + 1; time(); 2) t = t + 10; s = s * 4; 3) y = y * y; m = m -1; write(); 4) f = f + 5; 5) z = -z; read(); UB 4 is the initial UB because its first instruction immediately follows a system call, whereas UBs 3 and 5 the final UBs.
The algorithm to build SBG(P ) locates all the system calls inside CF G(P ) and, for each system call, discovers all the control paths from the system call to the next one. Then, the algorithm merges all the instructions in the UBs along these paths into a new SB and it inserts the corresponding node into SBG(P ). There is one arc leaving the new SB for each final UB coupled with a system call. In more details, the algorithm to map CF G(P ) into SBG(P ):
1) splits each BB containing n > 0 system calls into n+1 UBs (1, ..., n + 1), where the i-th block includes all the instructions in-between the (i − 1)th system call of the BB (if i = 1, from the first instruction of the BB) and the i-th system call of the BB (if i = n + 1, to the last instruction of the BB); 2) generates U BG(P ), which is the resulting graph of UBs according to the flow of CF G(P ); 3) visits U BG(P ) and for each node n that represents an initial UB:
• it starts a depth first visit of the graph;
• determines Succ(n), the set that includes any node m that represents either an UB that may be executed after n and that ends with a system call or the END block that terminates the program;
• merges into the same SB, SB(n), all the UBs represented by nodes on the path from n to any node in Succ(n). Notice that the same code fragment is replicated in a distinct SB for each control path that crosses such a fragment. Moreover, several arcs connect the same pair of nodes if distinct exit points of a SB result in the execution of the same SB. As an example of SBG generation, Fig. 2  and 3 show, respectively, the U BG(P ) and the SBG(P ) resulting from the CF G(P ) shown in Fig. 1 .
Currently, we build CF G(P ) from the source code but, in a real-world scenario, the graph should be deduced from the executable code through disassembly [13] after all the required libraries have been statically linked. This guarantees the consistency between the statically generated CF G(P ) Figure 1 . Control-Flow Graph and the run-time behavior. Moreover, the static analysis assumes that system calls are represented through wellknown lexical tokens that can be recognized by a parser. As an example, a parsing of the executable code should locate all int $0x80 and syscall assembly instructions (i.e., those instructions to issue system calls). If, instead, the source code is parsed, these tokens represent the LIBC wrappers for system calls.
IV. RUN-TIME ARCHITECTURE
This section discusses the run-time architecture that implements the proposed strategy.
To prevent the execution of injected code, we partition the information of the program between two VMs: the Blocks-VM and the Graph-VM. With respect to solutions that partition information among a set of processes [7] , our solution is more robust because of the stronger isolation of information enabled by VMs. In fact, the Blocks-VM only stores the SBs without any information about their execution order. The actual order of the SBs in the memory of the Blocks-VM may be decided at compile-time or updated at load-time. The Graph-VM implements the transfer of control among these blocks through introspection [1] by directly updating the return address in the stack of the Blocks-VM at each system call. The Graph-VM computes the value to update the stack through an array N extSB of SBs that associates each SB with a set of dictionary data structures Figure 2 . Unit Block Graph of the form system call, call address, hash value, next SB identifier whose key is the pair (system call, call address) and where the hash value is computed by applying a hash function to the current SB. This data structure exploits the notion that given a SB and one of the system calls that may terminate the execution of this SB, the return address of the call is that of the first instruction of the next SB to be executed after this call. Hence, by using this address we correctly sequentialize the SBs as in the original program. If and only if the hash of the current SB is equal the value stored in N extSB, the Graph-VM inserts the correct return address in the user stack. To this end, a jump table maps the identifier of the next SB, found in N extSB, into the virtual address of the next SB, i.e. the return address. The jump table makes it possible to correctly sequentialize the SBs even if any virtual address changes at any execution because of a new permutation of 
A. Control-Flow Partitioning
By applying the algorithm previously described, the compiler produces: (i) a binary file with the code of all the SBs in some arbitrary order; (ii) one or more files with information about: (a) SBG(P ), which describes control transfer among the SBs; (b) the SB localizator, which records the initial and final address of each SB in the binary file. The SB localizator also contains an index for N extSB that associates, at runtime, a SB with it virtual address. This address is used to update the return address of the Blocks-VM: in fact, the current return address is invalid because the SBs have been randomly permuted in the binary file. Any information but the binary file is stored in the Graph-VM that it protects by the Blocks-VM. Only the Obfuscator in the Graph-VM can access N extSB. The localizator may also be used to determine the boundaries of a SB.
A SB consists of a set of UBs. Each UB is coupled with: (i) an unique identifier; (ii) the virtual memory address of At run-time, to discover the arc associated with the system call that has been invoked, we cannot use only the system call token, i.e. the name of the system call, because the same system call may appear at several distinct program points. For this reason, the Obfuscator uses both the system call and its virtual address inside the text segment, which is unique for each system call. In the current prototype, at run-time the virtual address of each system call is deduced by the return address of the invocation, which is the address of the instruction that immediately follows the system call (therefore, by subtracting 1 to the return address, we obtain the call address). The technical reason is that when a system call is issued and trapped the current program counter stores the virtual address of the kernel instruction that is executing the system call handler rather than the system call virtual address. By retrieving from the stack the return address of the system call, we know the virtual address that immediately follows the system call site and, therefore, the one of the system call.
As soon as the Obfuscator knows a system call address, it can: (i) identify the transitions between SBs to locate the next SB and retrieve its first address (i.e., the correct return address) through the jump table: this table is indexed by the SB identifier retrieved from the N extSB keyed with the current system call and its virtual address; (ii) redirect the process control-flow to the first instruction of the next SB. To locate the system call virtual address, the Obfuscator in the Graph-VM: (i) accesses the Blocks-VM VCPU context to read the kernel_sp register, which points to the top of the kernel stack; (ii) maps the Blocks-VM kernel stack; (iii) reads the ESP register, which points to the base of the Blocks-VM user stack; (iv) maps the Blocks-VM user stack; (v) locates the return address of the system call in the user stack of the application; (vi) subtracts 1 to obtain the call address.
Since the correct offset from the stack pointer depends upon the system call, to implement the last step, the Obfuscator reads the system call identifier in the EAX register to identify the system call and to locate the return address in the stack. As previously said, the transition among SBs is identified by the system call and its virtual address. However, in some cases, such as in recursive functions, the Obfuscator cannot deduce the next SB from the system call address because the same system call may be coupled with several arcs. In this case, the Obfuscator scans the stack to detect the SB that has generated the call. Further alternative solutions are: (i) function inlining, i.e. the compiler generates code so that any system call has a distinct address for each case; (ii) the compiler generates code to locate the first return address in the stack that is different in all the cases.
B. Run-Time Components
The run-time support (see Fig. 4 ) includes the interceptor module in the Blocks-VM, the Obfuscator in the Graph-VM, which also stores a set of configuration files. In the current implementation, the Interceptor Module is implemented by HiMod [2] , a kernel module in the Blocks-VM, that intercepts the system calls and informs the Graph-VM that a system call has been executed.
The Obfuscator in the Graph-VM can access: (i) any memory location of the Blocks-VM with read and write permissions; (ii) N extSB; (iii) SBG(P ); (iv) the jump table. The Obfuscator receives an event anytime P invokes a system call and then: (i) freezes the execution of the Blocks-VM and then access its stack; (ii) computes and checks the hash of the current SB; (iii) deduces the next SB to be executed through the current system call that is identified by both the current return address in the user stack and the system block graph; (iv) updates the Blocks-VM return address to point to the next SB; (v) resumes the execution of the Blocks-VM. In the current solution, the information about SBG(P ) are XORed after step 2 to decrypt the information about the next SB [7] . The value to be XORed against the information about SBG(P ) depends upon the next SB.
Two configuration files in the Graph-VM stores information about the SBs. The first file, graph.xml, stores the representation of the SBs and its core element is the SB (<system>), which is coupled with:
• <id>: an integer value greater than or equal to zero, used as ID of the initial SB;
• <start_address>: the virtual address of the first instruction inside the SB;
• <exit_point>: it represents an arc to the next SB. An exit point contains: -<return_address>: the value of the return address identifying the arc; -<next_system_id>: the ID of the next SB.
• <unit_block_id>: ID for an UB belonging to the SB. The second file, codesegment.xml records the virtual address of each UB and contains:
• <CSstart_address>: the initial code segment address;
• <CSend_address>: the final code segment address;
• unit_block: it represents an UB, and it contains: -<id>: ID for the UB; -<initial_address>: initial virtual address of the UB; -<size>: length of the UB.
V. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we discuss the threat model underlying the proposed approach.
Our threat model considers a system running a shadow VM, the Graph-VM, that can apply introspection to access and manipulate any information in the Blocks-VM. In this way, even if code is injected into the Blocks-VM, no jump to this code is possible because the shadow VM periodically checks the status of the Blocks-VM and updates the information on this VM according to the original program. In this way, code can be injected but its execution is prevented because, even if the attacker fully controls the Blocks-VM, she cannot prevent the control from being transferred to the Graph-VM that checks the status of the Blocks-VM and updates the return address according to the original controlflow. Since the attacker does not know the value of the return address, it is highly unlikely that the injected code can anticipate this update and behave accordingly. Furthermore, since the permutation can be generated each time a program is executed, information about previous executions cannot be exploited to reduce the number of accesses to deduce the correct ordering. A fundamental assumption underlying our approach is that a process can implement security critical operations through system calls only. Thus, provided that the kernel and the underlying virtual machine monitor (VMM) are (initially) trusted, any attempt to inject malicious code into a process memory to modify its behavior can become effective only at system call sites. These are the only program points when control is switched from the two VMs.
As far as concerns attacks against the solution, at first we show how the proposed solution cannot prevent code injection but the execution of such code, then we consider the complexity for an attacker to remove the obfuscation to deduce information of interest. First of all, the proposed solution does not prevent code injection into the stack or any another run-time structure. If the attacker injects code into the stack, e.g. using the write() system call, she can attempt to execute malicious code by updating the correct return address to point to the injected code, e.g. for invoking a shell through the proper system calls. If the injected code is executed, the inconsistency may arise at the next system call that, in general, will be different from the expected one. Hence, the Graph-VM will not be able to retrieve, in the jump table, the call that has been executed that differs from the expected one. In this case, the Graph-VM stops the Blocks-VM. If the call that is executed is one of those that ends the SB, then the Graph-VM updates the return address in the stack. Hence, the code that is executed after the call is not the one that has been injected. Notice that inconsistencies arise even in the case of return-oriented or return-to-libc attacks [14] .
Obviously, the attacker may try to deduce from the program execution any information she needs to properly design the code that is injected. Hence, we consider now the complexity of discovering this information by accessing the memory of the Block-VM or of the Graph-VM. To evaluate the number of memory accesses, we consider that, in practice, the attacker has to learn the source and destination of any arc of SBG(P ). If the attacker can only access the information in the memory of the Blocks-VM, then the program has to be run a number of times that suffices to discover any exit point of a SB and the corresponding successor. The resulting complexity increases with the number of SBs and of exit points of each SB. Lastly, it is also related to the complexity for the attacker of timing the access to read a SB that has not been previously executed. The existence of an exit point, i.e. of a system call, may be hidden by replacing it with a fake instruction that results in a trap, e.g. using null system calls [15] . In this case, the Graph-VM applies introspection not only to update the return address but also to insert the proper parameters in the registers of the virtual processor.
To further increase the complexity of reverse engineering, we may increase the number of SBs by adopting wellknown optimization techniques, such as loop-unrolling, that increase the number of SBs by replicating several times the BBs within a loop. If these BBs include more than one SB, then the number of SBs and the complexity of removing the obfuscation increases as well. However, this transformation may be ineffective if the attacker discovers that several BBs have the same successor because they are equal.
A further strategy to increase the number of SBs moves the evaluation of if conditions to the Graph-VM. Assume that the expression of the first if statement of a system block SB if can be evaluated through introspection when the last system call before SB if is issued. This implies that SB if can be replaced by a set of SBs that are copies of SB if but where each copy includes just one branch of the conditional statement. When the SB executed just before SB if terminates, the Graph-VM accesses the memory of the Blocks-VM, evaluates the if condition and then updates the return address of the Blocks-VM to execute one of the copies of SB if corresponding to the proper branch of the conditional statement. If this transformation is applied, then further obfuscation strategies are possible because now several SBs can follow the same call. Hence, we can simply replicate a SB and, when a predecessor of such a SB terminates, choose one of the copies with a predefined probability. If and only if all the copies are executed, an attacker can discover that they follow the same SB. The complexity of reverse engineering is increased if the probability of choosing the SBs is not be uniform so that a large number of executions is required to execute all the copies.
In the proposed solution, the attacker can subvert the Graph-VM from the Blocks-VM only if the VMM is vulnerable, but the likelihood of a successful attack may be neglected. In fact, a VMM is more robust than commodity OSes because: (i) it exports a simple interface to the higher levels, which is more difficult to subvert than, for example, the one of a kernel that implements hundreds of system calls; (ii) the small size of the VMM code reduces the likelihood of a compromise and makes it possible to validate its correct implementation through a formal analysis.
The proposed strategy cannot be applied if the attacker has an access to the memory of the Graph-VM because she can access the information to sequentialize the blocks. However, an encryption-based strategy may be adopted to protect N extSB from such an attacker. This strategy, similar to that in [7] , does not solve the problem but strongly increases the complexity of the attack because it forces the access to be repeated for each distinct SB. In this solution, N extSB also contains a table that has a distinct entry for each SB that stores a key to XOR N extSB. Anytime a SB terminates, N extSB is fully updated by XORing it with a key that depends upon the next SB to be executed. In this way, even if the attacker can access the memory of the Graph-VM she cannot access any information that simplifies the reverse engineering of the control-flow because, at each call, the only information in clear is the one about the current SB, while any information about other SBs and the successor(s) of the current SB is encrypted. Hence, even in this case an attacker has to execute the program a number of times that depends upon the number of SBs and the number of exit points of each SB.
VI. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
In this section, we present a first set of performance results and compare them with previous solutions.
Using a CPU Intel code 2 Duo T7500 2.2. GHz with 3GB DDR2 RAM, we tested the latency of the following mechanisms: (i) system call interception; (ii) localization of the return address; (iii) SB transition.
The interception of a system call requires two steps: (i) the trap of the current system call by the HiMod; (ii) the communication of the HiMod to alert the Obfuscator. Hence, the resulting time (C int ) is the sum of the system call interception latency, the channel event latency to inform the Obfuscator and the time spent by the HiMod waiting for the notification by the Obfuscator. The tested average value for this time is:
As previously said, to locate the return address the Graph-VM has to (i) retrieve the value of a register; (ii) unwind two stacks. If C get denotes the time of this computation, then:
where x is the number of kernel-stack frames to traverse, a is the cost to examine a stack frame, d is the cost to read the EBP register (the pointer to the current frame), retrieve the value of the saved register at the bottom of the kernelstack and analyze the top of the user-stack, y is the number of user-stack frames to be scanned if the Graph-VM cannot deduce the return address from the information in the top frame of the user stack. If the optional part is not required (i.e., y = 0), the tested average time for this operation is:
Finally, to implement a SB transition, the Graph-VM considers the node representing the current SB and searches the arc of SBG(P ) identified by the return address located in the previous step. Then, it updates some internal states and modifies the user stack of the Blocks-VM to point to the virtual address of the next SB. If C tstats denotes the average time for this operation, its tested value is:
and is negligible if some optimization are adopted, namely if the user stack is not unmapped when accessed from the Graph-VM. Hence, the fixed overhead coupled with each system call invocation is:
C int + C gret + C tstat = 11µsec + 4µsec + 0µsec = 15µsec
We tested the performance of our solution with bzip2 and, provided that we neglect virtualization, the corresponding overhead is at most 30%. In [11] , the authors discusses the performance overhead for CFI-protected shadow call stack instrumentation, which, on average, is 21%. In [7] , the time costs drops 83.2% with plain monitor process and 61% with obfuscation monitor process. Finally, the mean overhead of the solution proposed in [9] is 26.7%. The performance of our solution can be improved by adopting CPU architectures with virtualization support. In particular, this considerably reduces C int .
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
We have presented a code obfuscation framework to protect programs against injection attacks that decomposes a program into system blocks and system block graph and splits the information to run the program between two VMs. This strategy minimizes the amount of information to be stored in clear to run a program and can be fully transparent to the software stack. We have shown that this strategy can detect any injection-based attack since the injected code either executes an illegal system call or or modifies the instructions in the current block so that the Graph-VM cannot correctly sequentialize the various blocks.
This framework may be generalized because the Graph-VM may interact with components on other nodes, e.g. in a cloud, to check that the configuration of the underlying node satisfies some constrains before sequentializing the various blocks. To this end, an area of future research is focused on the remote attestation of the Graph-VM [16] so that a program is run on the Blocks-VM only if the Graph-VM, the VMM and any underlying software are properly configured, i.e. only if the overall security level that the node offers is acceptable.
